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ployer into a quandary as to discharge or forced retirement of
his employees. It is interesting to speculate as to what effect a
change in the factual situation might have had on the decision.
As previously mentioned, had the deceased been actively at work
when the letter was received, his argument as to "in the course"
would have been strengthened considerably. Had the letter contained material which had more connection with his particular
employment, such as the escape of a convict who had threatened
him, then the case as to "arising out of" would have been
strengthened. It cannot be said that one or both of these factual
changes would have resulted in an award of compensation, but
certainly in such a case, a stronger argument in favor of such an
award would have existed.
Peyton Moore

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION DEATH BENEFITS - RIGHT OF
POSTHUMOUS ILLEGITIMATE TO BENEFIT PAYMENTS

Plaintiff sued for compensation on behalf of her minor child.
The father and mother of the child lived together in open concubinage while the father was still legally married to another
woman. The child was born eight months after its father was
accidentally killed during the course of his employment. The
trial court denied recovery but was reversed by the court of
appeal.' On appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, held, reversed, two Justices dissenting. Since a posthumous illegitimate
is not a member of the family and not actually dependent, he is
not entitled to recover compensation benefits under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Statute. Williams v. American
Employers Insurance Co., 237 La. 101, 110 So.2d 541 (1959).
Under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Statute, if an
industrial accident causes death within two years, a worker's
dependents may receive benefit payments. 2 Dependents are
classified as (1) those conclusively presumed to be dependent,8
and (2) those who must prove actual dependency.4 Legitimate
children, legitimate adopted children, legitimate posthumous
children, legitimate stepchildren, and illegitimate children acknowledged under Articles 203, 204, and 205 of the Louisiana
1.
2.
3.
4.

Williams v. American Employers Ins. Co., 103 So.2d 568 (La. App. 1958).
LA. R.S. 23:1231 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1956, No. 412.
Id. 23:1251.
Id. 23:1252.
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Civil Code are conclusively presumed to be dependent. 5 These
children need only show that they are under the age of eighteen,
or if they are over the age of eighteen that they are physically
or mentally incapacitated from earning a living, and that they
were living with the deceased parent at the time of the injury or
death.6 The Louisiana judiciary has consistently held that unacknowledged illegitimates cannot be conclusively presumed dependent.7 However, where the party claiming compensation is
not conclusively presumed to have been actually dependent upon
the deceased employee for support, he may nevertheless receive
benefits under the act if he can prove (1) actual dependency
upon the earnings of the employee for support at the time of his
death," and (2) that either he was a member of the family of
the deceased employee or was related to the employee as husband
or wife, or lineal descendant or ascendant, or brother or sister.,
Following this statutory formula the Louisiana courts have held
that illegitimates may receive death benefits where they are
shown to have been members of the family or household of the
deceased at the time of his death and were actually dependent
upon him for support.'0 Prior to the instant case the question
of whether or not a posthumous illegitimate was entitled to benefit payments had not been litigated in Louisiana, but it has generally been held in jurisdictions having statutes similar to Louisiana's that a posthumous illegitimate is not considered a member of the deceased's family and is not actually dependent upon
him for support at the time of death."
In the instant case the court denied compensation by reasoning that the posthumous illegitimate was neither a member of
the deceased's family nor actually dependent upon the deceased
5. Id. 23:1021(3), 23:1251. Dangerfield v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 209 La. 195,
24 So.2d 375 (1945) ; Thompson v. Vestal Lumber & Mfg. Co., 208 La. 83, 22
So.2d 842 (1945).
6. LA. R.S.23:1251(3) (1950).
7. Beard v. Rickert Rice Mills, Inc., 185 La. 55, 168 So. 492 (1936) ; Perkins
v. Brownell-Drews Lbr. Co., 147 La. 337, 84 So. 894 (1920) ; Dangerfield v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 19 So.2d 598 (La. App. 1944); Ellis v. Union Compress &
Whse. Co., 178 So. 726 (La. App. 1931) ; Stewart v. Parish of Jefferson Davis,
136 So. 659 (La. App. 1931) ; Wells v. White-Grandin Lbr. Co., 129 So. 171 (La.
App. 1930) ; Gullung v. Dalgarn Const. Co., 1 La. App. 147 (Orl. App. 1924).
8. LA. R.S. 23:1252, 23:1254 (1950).
9. Ibid.
10. Caddo Contracting Co. v. Johnson, 222 La. 796, 64 So.2d 177 (1953)
Thompson v. Vestal Lbr. & Mfg. Co., 208 La. 83, 22 So.2d 842 (1945) ; Jenkins
v. Pemberton, 87 So.2d 775 (La. App. 1956); Patin v. T. L. James & Co., 42
So.2d 304 (La. App. 1949) ; Williams v. Jahncke Service, Inc., 38 So.2d 400
(La. App. 1949) ; Lunkin v. Triangle Farms, Inc., 24 So.2d 213 (La. App. 1945).
11. See, generally, 99 C.J.S., Workmen's Compensation § 141(2) (1958) and
58 Am. Jvs., Workmen's Compensation § 175 (1948).
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at the time of death. The court held that the term "member of
the family" referred only to living persons and that a child would
only become a member of the family at birth. 12 Although the
unborn child was certainly actually dependent upon its mother,
the court reasoned that the child could only be considered constructively dependent upon its father and hence not entitled to
3
compensation.'
It would seem that in the instant case the court has departed
from the firmly established principle that the provisions of the
compensation statute should be liberally construed. The court
used a seemingly technical argument for disposing of the plaintiff's case.' 4 It is submitted that this decision is not in keeping
with the intent and spirit of the compensation principle. 5 In
passing the compensation statute, the legislature placed upon
industry the burden of supporting those who were dependent
upon a worker killed in the industry's operation. It was deemed
a better social policy that industry and its consumers should
carry this load rather than society as a whole. From its inception the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Statute was designed to place the burden of supporting legitimates on industry
and its consumers. 16 Posthumous legitimates were specifically
12. "The illegitimate, posthumous son of this plaintiff, in our opinion, was
not a member of the family of the employee at the time of the latter's death. As
was correctly stated by the district judge . . . it is unreasonable, and therefore not
within the contemplation of the statute, to say that an unborn child is a member
of the family, for that term connotes a living person. The unborn child becomes
a member of the family upon birth. The right to compensation is determined upon
the basis of facts existing at the time of the death of the employee, and not deferred to await the contingency of live birth." Williams v. American Employers
Ins. Co., 237 La. 101, 106, 110 So.2d 541, 543 (1959). It would seem by this
opinion that the court feels that at least as far as compensation is concerned that
the rights of a child, except where specifically mentioned by statute, do not come
into existence until birth.
13. "Furthermore, we are unable to conclude that plaintiff's posthumous son
was actually dependent (a prerequisite for recovery of compensation under the
'member of the family' doctrine) on his father. Undoubtedly he was actually
dependent on the mother at the time of the employee's death. But his dependency
on the father (if any existed), obviously, was only constructive, not actual."
Williams v. American Employers Ins. Co., 237 La. 101, 107, 110 So.2d 541, 543
(1959). This argument is ably answered in MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 304 (Supp. 1960).
14. The court's argument can be rebutted by the very able argument of the
court of appeal judge who said: "We perceive no anomaly in extending the benefits
of the statutes to a posthumous child of a deceased employee on the ground that
it was a dependent member of the family of the household of its deceased father at
the time of his death, even though it was then in embryo. Life was present, life
continued, and that life, before, at and after birth, was dependent upon the father
for its support and maintenance." Williams v. American Employers Ins. Co., 103
So.2d 568, 572 (La. App. 1958). The court of appeal opinion was adopted by
Justice Hawthorne in his dissent in the instant case.
15. See MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 32 (1951).
16. The provisions of LA. R.S. 23:1251 (1950) clearly evidence this.
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included in this coverage. 17 As a result of subsequent jurisprudence illegitimates also were held to come under the coverage
of the act.' Since the court has shifted the burden of supporting
illegitimates onto industry and the consumer, it seems somewhat
inconsistent that they now carve out a small niche of illegitimate
dependents and force them to look to society for their support.
It seems anomalous to allow compensation to posthumous legitimates and to illegitimates and yet deny recovery to posthumous
illegitimates. Certainly a contrary holding would not create any
great administrative problem. 19
Walter I. Lanier, Jr.
17. Id. 23:1021(3).
18. See note 10 supra.
19. This case is also noted in 34 TuL. L. REv. 421 (1960).

